The Bourgeois Revolution in India (Part 1)


Jawaharlal Nehru giving the “Tryst with Destiny” speech at Indian independence.


Indian independence is a problem that has long perplexed Marxists of both activist and academic persuasions. This is most true in India itself, whose Marxism remains dominated by the vapid and economic determinist perspectives of Stalinism (the official CPI, its considerably larger splinter, the CPI (M), etc) or by Maoism (The CPI (Maoist), CPI (ML) – Liberation and other groups) both of which are theoretically at least well past their sell-by date.

The perspectives of Indian independence as an event can be summed up as two opposite narratives, both of which the original CPI held at one time or another. The left narrative, as I call it, is an outright denial of reality: there was a show of independence, but India is still not really independent, it is still dominated by imperialism and requires a democratic struggle to liberate it from the West and comprador bourgeoisie which are its agents. Such is the perspective of Indian Maoists: unfortunately, the “national bourgeoisie” which they seek to ally themselves with has set out to exterminate them.

The other, “right” narrative, may match historical reality a bit closer, but the implied strategy it proposes is no less disastrous. It might be summed up like this: the Congress Party, under Gandhi and Nehru, led a partially successful struggle for national independence, but it was undermined by continuing links with the West. What is required, just like in the left narrative, is also “real” independence, but this is to be achieved through gradual reform – once again allied with the national bourgeoisie in the form of the state and the Congress Party.

Outside of India, Marxist theorizations of 1947 can be almost as disappointing, and often, shamefully, they are put forward by anti-Stalinists. The original Trotskyist position that Gandhi and Nehru would inevitably “sell out” the freedom struggle should have been thrown to the wind when independence was achieved; unfortunately many Trotskyists chose to ignore reality by pointing to the Congress-led India’s continuing links to the West, or disregarded the matter altogether.

Surely this is more than a bit unfortunate. Indian independence was the beginning of the wave of decolonization after the Second World War and provided the template for many freedom struggles thereafter. A Marxist understanding of decolonization, which shapes the modern world, has to include an understanding of Indian independence.

Outside of Marxism, perspectives have been if anything more frustrating. Since the 1980s, that part of the English-speaking academy dealing with the Global South has turned toward “post-colonial” perspectives, which are characterized by cultural studies that often disregard completely the actual history of independence and partition, dissolving the category into endless explorations of memory, history-from-below, and so on. There is of course an anti-historical stance in all this that resonates with postmodernism, and that in focusing on matters of culture matches its predecessor in the field, orientalism (Chibber 2006 and 2013).

This essay is a beginning of an attempt to correct understandings of the social and economic significance of Indian independence. I majored in South Asian studies as an undergraduate, and wrote my thesis on the CPI and Indian independence from 1939-1945. Therefore I don’t feel the need to cite many sources of Indian history. The developments I describe should be familiar to people who know the history of Indian independence, although I will try to provide the context for people less familiar with it.

At the same time, I will attempt to trace the different Marxist understandings of the Indian anti-colonial movement under the hegemony of the Indian National Congress (INC) from the debates surrounding it within the early Comintern (the works of V.I. Lenin and the Indian revolutionary and theorist M.N. Roy being particularly important here), to the development of Comintern orthodoxy, and the rival view put forth by Trotsky and his followers in India and around the world.

Finally, I will try to offer some account of what I believe is the most fruitful work of Marxists developed in response to decolonization: that of the International Socialist (IS) tradition, including the successive contributions of Tony Cliff, John Rees, Alex Callinicos and finally Neil Davidson, all leaders and/or theoreticians of the British Socialist Workers’ Party, which – full disclosure – I find myself pretty closely aligned with.

Davidson, in my view, first drew out the implications of the previous writers that independence for the colonies in most respects were events that can be set aside the bourgeois revolutions of Holland, Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan and others that we see spanning the modern era from the 16th to perhaps the early 20th  centuries (Davidson 2012). I will try to take up his argument applying it specifically to the Indian case, perhaps the most significant of these “late” bourgeois revolutions.

Of course, this will involve a great deal of synthesis, which might get ponderous at some times. I ask for readers’ indulgence. If I am right, which is worth considering, this might be educational for us all.

The Indian Freedom Movement Before 1919

The original Marxist perspectives on the Indian freedom movement had little to do with academic understandings of the process. They were formulated as strategy in an era in which the revolutionary movement was on the rise worldwide, and was perceived to stand a chance of liberating the colonies, both by its followers and its enemies.

Crucially, the worldwide communist movement and the struggle for Indian independence arose as coherent movements around the same time. Therefore they would have a great impact on each other ideologically as well as practically. In any case, a few words about India before Communism are in order.

The British colonization, as Marx had predicted in many of his writings, successfully introduced capitalist relations of production. This is not the place for a discussion of whether India is capitalist or “semi-feudal, semi-colonial.” The Stalinist and Maoist views of this are mirror images of each other, which I tried to elucidate above. Anyone who agrees with this view is probably better off going back to the basics of Marxism on what exactly constitutes capitalism.

Another view that rejects Indian capitalism under the Raj, that of academics aligned with the “political Marxist” school of Robert Brenner and Ellen Meiksins Wood, I will also not deal with, except to say that both Stalinists and political Marxists have a lot to explain about Indian economic development under the Raj, particularly the penetration of usury capital into the Indian countryside, a process of differentiation within the Indian peasantry which led to some constituting themselves as capitalists and others as waged workers for them, and of course rapid and unprecedented industrialization in the cities (Banaji 2011).

To return to Marx: he predicted that not only would Britain establish capitalism in India, but in the process that it would lay the seeds of its own downfall by endowing Indians with the capabilities to do this. The class of Indians, “Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect,” which Macaulay had eagerly sought to create, would end up overthrowing the British by virtue of their own British education. Such was the sophisticated and dialectical nature of Marx’s writings on India – they were as far as could be from the academic perspective viewing him as a racist and Eurocentrist cheerleading for colonialism (Anderson 2010, Ahmad 1992 and Jani 2002).


The first session of the Indian National Congress, December 1885.

The Indian freedom movement, it could be called that, received most of its expression between the Mutiny of 1857 and the turn of the century in the form of the Indian National Congress. Founded by the Scottish humanist A.O. Hume, the Congress was originally conceived of as a debating society for Indian native colonial officials and intellectuals. Its political remit, such as it was, aimed at gradually helping the British to reform their rule, mostly as a way to improve opportunities and access for the native middle class intended to be its base.

The Congress’ base became upper levels of educated Hindus participating in the rule of India: colonial officials, lawyers and other professionals. At this stage, Indian Muslims did not take much part; the leaders of their community were suspicious of the dominance of the Hindu majority, and even, in the case of Syed Ahmed Khan, sought an alliance with the British to forestall it.

All this was blown open by events in Bengal after the turn of the century. In 1905, the British sought to partition Bengal into eastern and western provinces – supposedly for the purposes of administration, but at the time it was seen as a move that would divide Muslims, concentrated in the East, and Hindus, concentrated in the West, with negative effects for both communities. Bengal had been the vanguard of modernizing Indian intellectuals from its cultural revival in the late 19th century, and the novels of the colonial official Bankim Chandra Chatterjee already showed a strong proto-nationalist sentiment in that era.

The Congress had little to say or do about the partition of Bengal – its position was to work with the British to reform its governance. Home Rule or independence was scarcely mentioned or thought of by its members. In response, a very different strain of Indian nationalism arose as a split from the Congress. Led by radical Hindus such as Lala Lajpat Rai, Bal Gandhadar Tilak and Aurobindo Ghosh, the “extremists” as history calls them plotted heroic acts of terrorism against British rule, blowing up offices, seizing weaponry and the like. Their first attempt at Indian independence took the form of an abortive rising with the aid of Germany as Britain was distracted in Europe by the First World War.

It was probably inevitable that the Congress, which claimed the right to represent all of India, would have to change in response to this. The rise to leadership by M.K. Gandhi, a London-educated barrister who had risen to prominence in anti-discrimination campaigns of the Indian community in South Africa, would signal this shift. But more of that later.

Marxist Perspectives: The Early Comintern (1919-1927)

Indian independence was a problem that was crucial to the early Communist movement. Seeking an alliance of the workers and the oppressed peoples of the world to overthrow capitalism, the leaders of the Comintern could scarcely afford to ignore India, the crown jewel in the empire of Britain, simultaneously the greatest power in the world and the possessor of the most colonies. Debates on the perspectives of Indian independence would produce the most fruitful work of Marxism on the anti-colonial struggles since Marx himself.

The debate got going early. The two protagonists: V.I. Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik Party and therefore the person with the most authority in the young Comintern, and M.N. Roy, a younger Indian communist recently won to Marxism from extremist Indian nationalism after a long exile from his home.

The debate that followed is too in-depth to be completely summarized, but we can have a few broad strokes. Lenin, referring to the position of the defunct Russian Empire as a “prisonhouse of nations,” pointed to what he saw as the objectively revolutionary nature of nationalist struggles in Finland and Poland. This was a position he had defended with success in the pre-1917 Bolshevik Party (Lenin 1914). Extrapolating this position, he argued that (1) anti-colonial struggles took the form of objectively revolutionary wars against capitalist imperialism, whatever progressive or reactionary content they had, and that therefore (2) it was imperative on Communists in colonized countries to support them as their most revolutionary wing.


M.N. Roy traveled from radical Indian nationalism, to ultra-leftism, to Right Oppositionism, to return to a strange form of nationalism he called “radical humanism.”

Roy took an opposing position. Drawing on his background as an Indian freedom fighter, he argued that it was unrealistic to seek in groups like the Congress a “nationalist bourgeoisie” or middle class. The Congress was not based on capitalist but rather feudal relations, and even the ascent of Gandhi as a major figure meant his party’s descent into religious obscurantism. The Indian proletariat, Roy concluded, was strong enough given the rapid development of capitalism in the country could take over and win the freedom struggle, in the process transforming it into a socialist revolution (Haithcox 1971).

The debate ended in a draw: though Lenin was the figure of greatest authority in the Comintern, Roy was able to speak from authority on Indian matters. Moreover, his position appealed to the impatient, ultra-revolutionary section of the Comintern which Lenin was in the process of breaking from. The final theses on national and colonial questions stated that Communists should seek to give support and lead the “revolutionary movements of liberation” within the colonial countries – giving Roy and his co-thinkers room to argue that forces like the Congress were not “revolutionary movements” (Overstreet and Windmiller 1959).

These two perspectives, with many variations, would dominate Communist thinking on the Congress and the nationalist movement it led until 1947, and, as I have explained, continue to be influential in historical discussions. History has been much kinder to Lenin than to Roy. Roy vastly overestimated the strength of the young Indian proletariat, still very much in formation as a class, and 1947 would disprove his conception that the Congress would not or could not lead a nationalist revolution and the subsequent capitalist development of India – by which point, Roy had abandoned communism for a weird form of nationalism. Lenin’s documents, on the other hand, continue to be an invaluable resource on the Comintern’s anti-colonial strategies and tactics.

Marxist Perspectives: Stalinist Orthodoxy (1930-1947)

The Communist Party of India (CPI) was not quick in its formation. Plagued by problems of organization and vast waves of repression launched by the British, the CPI after several false starts was born as a coherent group and member of the Comintern in 1930. This was the heyday of the ultra-leftist Third Period. The CPI’s line in this period was characterized by extreme sectarianism toward the national movement and an absolute refusal to participate in even the most massive agitations against British rule. It may be unfair to say that Indian communists proudly donned British suits in the midst of a mass boycott campaign against English clothes, as one polemical historian puts it (Masani 1954), but the allegation suggests at least that this is how they were perceived.

They were not entirely incorrect in seeing the Congress as bankrupt, at least from a perspective that expected a consistently revolutionary movement of national liberation. Gandhi’s abandonment of the mass movement in the wake of the violence in Chauri Chaura (1922) and his audience a decade later with the Viceroy, after which he suspended the popular salt agitation (1932) confirmed to them that the Congress would continually betray Indian aspirations to the British. It was a representative of the compromising Indian ruling class, pretending to lead mass movements for independence at the same time they sought to ingratiate themselves with the British.

At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which marked a complete reversal of the Third Period lines, the Indian comrades took center stage. They were sharply criticized by Wang Ming, a veteran of the Chinese CP, for ignoring the nationalist movement. Such behavior, Wang said, played directly into the hands of the right-wing leadership of the Congress – Gandhi and his followers. The CPI should enter the Congress as a leftist flank (Wang 1935). The publication of theses by Ben Bradley and Rajani Palme Dutt, leaders of the British CP, spelled out the approach they should take in detail – which was dutifully enacted (Chowdhury 2007).

The following period was the most fruitful up till then of the CPI. By ending their isolation, they were able to move among the ranks of thousands of Congressmen to whom they had previously cut themselves off. They formed an alliance with the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), a radicalizing group of Fabians, marxisant intellectuals and left-wing Gandhians. The alliance eventually led to them gaining several seats on the All-India Congress Committee, the governing body of the INC.

The Second World War marked the beginnings of rapid and bewildering shifts in CPI policy vis-à-vis the Congress, which I know from personal experience can get quite tiresome to recount. Broadly speaking, the questions were these: could the Congress under Gandhi’s leadership genuinely resist this British? And if not, could the Communists lead the genuine freedom struggle? These questions of course had inverse answers, and the line changed sharply depending on the CPI’s assessment of its own forces and influence, that of the Congress and its Gandhian leadership, and of course the situation of the war, especially the fortunes of the Soviet Union.


Quit India procession by Bangalore Congressmen.

From 1939-1941, the CPI sought to push the freedom struggle forward against Gandhi. From 1941-1945, they called on him to seek a genuine anti-fascist alliance with Britain, a period which associated the CPI forever with the idea (not unfounded) that they had openly scabbed on the independence movement. Finally, after the war they reverted to their previous Popular Front position, seeking to be the left wing of the national movement once again (Overstreet and Windmiller 1959, Druhe 1959 and particularly Gupta 2008)

To summarize: the history of the CPI in these years consists of rapid changes in line from the “right” viewpoint on Congress nationalism to the “left” viewpoint and back. These changes, broadly inspired by Comintern directives although not mechanically ordered in every case, would leave the CPI unprepared for dealing with the problems independence in 1947 confronted them with. These perspectives, though opposite in form, I propose were two sides of the same coin. Both assumed that the Congress under Gandhi would and could not lead a genuine freedom struggle against the British – and that it was the CPI’s job to try and take control of the movement and lead it to true liberation.

These assumptions were mistaken. The Congress under Gandhi had taken quite radical steps toward Indian independence. It was Gandhi’s leadership that transformed the Congress into a mass force capable of this. He led the masses against the British time and time again, and would, albeit reluctantly, lead them into the most radical struggle yet, the Quit India agitation of 1943. Of his many compromises with the British, Communists were correct to point them out. But they did not consider that perhaps these compromises reflected that Gandhi and the Congress leadership had their own particular interests, which were as different from the interests of British imperialism as they were from those of the Indian peasants and workers.

Marxist Perspectives: The Trotskyist Alternative (1930-1947)

Leon Trotsky, the second leader of the Comintern after Lenin until the mid-1920s, was deeply concerned with colonial questions as well. After 1925, the main breach in the Russian CP – and therefore in the Comintern – was carried on in the context of perspectives on the Chinese Revolution. Whereas Stalin and Bukharin argued for the Chinese CP to remain as the revolutionary wing of the bourgeois-nationalist Guomindang (GMD), Trotsky correctly predicted the betrayal of the Communists by the GMD leading to their massacre and the abortion of the 1927 revolution. In a period in which not just independence, but working-class revolution in China was on offer, their position represented so far the greatest betrayal by the Stalinist faction, already establishing itself as a ruling class within the Soviet Union and hegemonic within the Comintern.

After the disaster in China, Trotsky was moved to reevaluate his theory of permanent revolution, of which he had been a consistent advocate for two decades. Permanent revolution had previously only been applied to Russia: as a result of the combined development of the Russian economy, the proletariat was capable of leading a socialist revolution with the support of the peasantry even before a full capitalist transformation had taken place.

In fact, it would be imperative on the proletariat to do so. The Russian bourgeoisie, coming into existence as the child of economic intervention by the Tsarist autocracy, would cling desperately to its epaulettes rather than lead a revolution against it. A mass insurrection required to overthrow the autocracy could destabilize the country and lead to a situation in which the proletariat, rather than the bourgeoisie, could seize power. The 1917 revolution confirmed Trotsky’s view in every respect.


Trotsky’s official portrait as commander of the Red Army. Needless to say he looks somewhat more formidable here than in his later years.

Now, however, Trotsky saw a similar pattern working itself out in China. Permanent revolution was confirmed there as it had been in Russia, but by negative inversion. Because the Stalinists had led them astray, the Chinese proletariat went down in a catastrophic defeat, maintaining the dominance of the increasingly corrupt and pro-imperialist GMD.

Trotsky’s passionate writings in The Third International After Lenin evaluate the debacle in China as well as provide fresh and crucial perspectives on all colonial situations. The colonial bourgeoisie, he suggested, would just like their Russian cousins be weak and vacillating. In the end they would always support imperialism against mass movements of workers and peasants that threatened to displace them (Trotsky 1996).

It is important here to correct a misconception that I had at one point. Trotsky’s proposal of the strategy of permanent revolution in the colonies did not entirely match the position of Roy in 1921. Roy’s arguments to the Comintern were based on ultra-revolutionary impatience and a misunderstanding of class forces in India. In contrast, Trotsky’s was based on the correct assessment that the Chinese proletariat had indeed stood ready to take power.

His later mistake was to assume the same was true of countries like India. Given the nature of the period, this was an understandable mistake, but one with major consequences. Though he allowed that countries like Kemalist Turkey and revolutionary Mexico – the main places of his exile – had shown revolutionary anti-imperialist movements that did not move beyond the bounds of capitalist accumulation, he believed that these were the exception. It was to be shown after his death that they were the norm (Davidson 2012).

Trotsky was the most articulate and authoritative spokesperson for authentic Marxism in the 1930s. His voice not only determined the policy of his small band of followers in the Fourth International, but also was a key influence on all trends of Communist opposition and radicalizing social democrats. His writings on China, Germany, and Spain remain treasure houses for Marxist theory and practice. Unfortunately, he wrote comparatively little on India, and what he did write does not match the value of his other writings of the period.

Interestingly, close to India was one of two centers of Trotskyism outside of the West in the 1930s and 40s. The Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) in Ceylon was formed as a Communist Party in 1934, but in 1937 expelled its pro-Moscow wing and thereafter became firmly Trotskyist and probably the most significant Marxist force in South Asia at the time. During the war when they were forced to flee Ceylon for leading anti-British strikes on the tea plantations, most LSSP cadres went to India, where they founded the short-lived Bolshevik-Leninist Party of India, Ceylon and Burma (BLPI). Much of Trotsky’s information on India came from letters of these comrades.

The only significant piece Trotsky wrote on Indian affairs was his “Open Letter to the Workers of India,” published in 1939. In this short piece, Trotsky took a dim view of the CPI:  “The Comintern has completely renounced revolutionary struggle for India’s independence. It “demands” (on its hands and knees) the “granting” of “democratic liberties” to India by British imperialism.” Similarly, the Indian bourgeoisie was incapable of leading a genuine freedom movement:

The Indian bourgeoisie is incapable of leading a revolutionary struggle. They are closely bound up with and dependent upon British capitalism. They tremble for their own property. They stand in fear of the masses. They seek compromises with British imperialism no matter what the price and lull the Indian masses with hopes of reforms from above. The leader and prophet of this bourgeoisie is Gandhi. A fake leader and false prophet! Gandhi and his compeers have developed a theory that India’s position will constantly improve, that her liberties will continually be enlarged and that India will gradually become a Dominion on the road of peaceful reforms. Later on, perhaps even achieve full independence. (Trotsky 1939)

This notion, wrote Trotsky, was wrong because world capitalism stood on the precipice. Concessions to the Indian bourgeoisie could only be granted so long as capitalism, with Britain at the fore, marched forward. Now that it was in crisis, granting independence would not be thought of. Consequently there was a struggle for the permanent revolution. Though he agreed that any step the bourgeoisie took toward independence should “naturally” be supported, a fully revolutionary struggle was now on the agenda.

This perspective, tragically, was as wrong for India as it was for the rest of the world. Capitalism, having destroyed vast amounts of profits and labor in the war, showed it was capable of righting itself afterward. In India specifically, the working class Trotsky called on to lead a revolution remained in formation; it trailed behind the Congress or the reformism of the Stalinist CPI or the CSP. No workers’ revolution was on the agenda.

The end of the war presented revolutionaries with a new and entirely unprecedented situation around the world. It is not the place to go into it here, but the confusion Trotskyists showed toward world affairs was matched by their bewilderment at the event of Indian independence. While the BLPI was insignificant and did not manage to shape Indian events in any noticeable way, the Fourth International clung to the line laid down by Trotsky before his death. This was the source of a great many errors with theoretical and practical consequences.

The Palestinian Jewish Trotskyist Tony Cliff (Yigael Gluckstein) wrote an article in 1947 on the situation in India that, I think, is representative of the understanding of the events by the Fourth International as a whole. Writing for Workers International News, the newspaper of the International’s British section, Cliff expressed skepticism that Britain would really give up control of India. The Attlee government’s management of the Indian Constituent Assembly to include representatives from the princely states and communal electorates would postpone independence indefinitely. Though he acknowledged the Congress was being pushed toward independence from below, this was not, he claimed, in their own interest, which was to remain a junior partner of British imperialism.

Therefore, independence on their terms would be a “fake freedom.” The only way forward was to unite the industrial struggles of the proletariat with the agrarian ones of the peasantry. Cliff predicted that together, these would throw up Indian soviets, which could end the inter-communal religious conflict precipitated by the British. The revolutionary struggle, as Trotsky had written eight years earlier, was still the only way to win independence (Cliff 1947).

Cliff, therefore, accepted Trotsky’s viewpoint: not only was British imperialism incapable of granting independence or enacting any meaningful reforms, but the Indian bourgeoisie, represented by Gandhi and the Congress, was not interested in real independence, only seeking a better deal for itself within the same framework. Both of them were of course wrong, as wrong as their Stalinist opponents had been. Though it comes from a genuinely revolutionary perspective, mistakes made by Trotskyists about the situation in the world and India specifically reduced their line to one of Cominternism but without the Comintern.

If I have spent a great many words on the perspective of what was largely an insignificant force in India and worldwide, it is not merely to point out its mistakes but to explain the context out of which a more coherent Marxist understanding of Indian independence and the larger anti-colonial struggles would emerge. That understanding would be developed by Cliff and his followers in the International Socialist tradition. Until next time, then.

References for Part 1:

Ahmad, Aijaz (1992). “Marx on India – A Clarification.” In Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. London/New York: Verso.

Anderson, Kevin (2010). Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and Non-Western Societies. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Banaji, Jairus (2011). “Capitalist Domination and the Small Peasantry: The Deccan Districts in the Late Nineteenth Century,” pp. 277-322 in Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation. Chicago: Haymarket.

Chibber, Vivek (2006). “On the Decline of Class Analysis in South Asian Studies,” Critical Asian Studies 38.4, pp. 357-387.

Chibber, Vivek (2013). Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of Capital. London/New York: Verso.

Chowdhury, Satyabrata (2007). Leftism in India: 1917-1947. Basingstroke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cliff, Tony (1947). “Conflict in India,” Workers International News 7.1, pp. 27-32.

Davidson, Neil (2012). How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? Chicago: Haymarket.

Druhe, David (1959). Soviet Russia and Indian Communism. New York: Bookman Associates.

Gupta, D.N. (2008). Communism and Nationalism in Colonial India, 1939-1945. New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Haithcox, John (1971). Communism and Nationalism in India: M.N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920-1939. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP.

Jani, Pranav (2002). “Karl Marx, Eurocentrism and the 1857 revolt in British India,” pp. 81-100 in Crystal Bartolovich and Neil Lazarus, eds., Marxism, Modernity and Postcolonial Studies. Cambridge/New York: University of Cambridge.

Lenin, V.I. (1914). “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” pp. 393-454 in Lenin, Collected Works vol. 20. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Overstreet, Gene D. and Marshall Windmiller (1959). Communism in India. Berkeley: University of California.

Trotsky, Leon (1939). “An Open Letter to the Workers of India,” New International 5.9 pp. 263-266.

Trotsky, Leon (1996). The Third International After Lenin. New York: Pathfinder.

Wang Ming (1935). The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries. London: Modern Books.



Filed under History

2 responses to “The Bourgeois Revolution in India (Part 1)

  1. Pingback: On Vivek Chibber’s Critique of Postcolonial and Subaltern Studies | That Faint Light

  2. Pingback: Darwiniana » The Bourgeois Revolution in India

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